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Experimental estimates from Moving to Opportunity (MTO) show
no signiﬁcant impacts of moves to lower-poverty neighborhoods on
adult economic self-sufﬁciency four to seven years after random
assignment. The authors disagree with Clampet-Lundquist and
Massey’s claim that MTO was a weak intervention and therefore
uninformative about neighborhood effects. MTO produced large
changes in neighborhood environments that improved adult mental
health and many outcomes for young females. Clampet-Lundquist
and Massey’s claim that MTO experimental estimates are plagued
by selection bias is erroneous. Their new nonexperimental estimates
are uninformative because they add back the selection problems
that MTO’s experimental design was intended to overcome.
INTRODUCTION
Experimental analyses of the data from the “interim evaluation” of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Moving to Oppor-
1 Support for this research was provided by grants from the National Science Foun-
dation to the National Bureau of Economic Research (9876337 and 0091854) and the
National Consortium on Violence Research (9513040), as well as by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the National Institute of ChildMTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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tunity (MTO) housing mobility experiment, which measured outcomes
for participating adults and children four to seven years after random
assignment, ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impacts on adult economic outcomes from
the opportunity to move to lower-poverty neighborhoods (Orr et al. 2003;
Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007). In an articleinthisissue,SusanClampet-
Lundquist and Douglas Massey (hereafter “CM”) reassess the MTO
experimental estimates and present new nonexperimental estimates of
neighborhood impacts on economic self-sufﬁciency.
We are delighted that CM have undertaken a reanalysis of data from
the MTO interim evaluation. One of our teams’ key goals in partnering
with HUD and Abt Associates to fund, design, and implement the interim
MTO study was to contribute to the research infrastructure available for
studying neighborhood effects. A discussion about what the MTO data
imply about neighborhood effects is exactly the type of exchangewehoped
reanalysis of the MTO data would engender. We are particularly pleased
that this reanalysis has been carried out by CM, since Clampet-Lundquist
has previously collaborated with two members of our team (Duncan and
Kling) on qualitative studies of MTO adult employment and the behavior
of young people, and we hold Massey in the highest esteem for his many
distinguished scholarly contributions.
The basic arguments developed by CM are as follows: MTO was a
weak intervention for studying neighborhood effects because the exper-
iment was focused on generating residential integration by social class
rather than by both class and race. The low-poverty but predominantly
minority neighborhoods into which most MTO movers relocated are not
capable of producing substantial improvements in the economic outcomes
of MTO families. Moreover, the fact that many families who were offered
the chance to relocate through the MTO program did not do so, and that
some MTO movers subsequently moved to higher-poverty areas on their
Health and Development and the National Institute of Mental Health (R01-HD40404
and R01-HD40444), the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the Russell Sage Foun-
dation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the W. T.Grant
Foundation and the Spencer Foundation. Additional support was provided by grants
to Princeton University from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and from NICHD
(5P30-HD32030 for the Ofﬁce of Population Research), by the Princeton Industrial
Relations Section, the Bendheim-Thomas Center for Research on Child Wellbeing, the
Princeton Center for Health and Wellbeing, the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, and a Brookings Institution fellowship supported by the Andrew W. Mellon
foundation. Thanks to Susan Clampet-Lundquist, David Deming, Lisa Gennetian,
Harold Pollack, and seminar participants at the University of Chicago, Harvard, and
the Population Association of America meetings for helpful comments and assistance.
The MTO data used in this article are from HUD. The contents of this comment are
the views of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views or policies of HUD
or the U.S. government. Direct correspondence to Jens Ludwig, University of Chicago,
969 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637. E-mail: jludwig@uchicago.eduAmerican Journal of Sociology
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own, compromises the demonstration’s experimental design by imparting
selection bias to estimates of the MTO intervention’s effects. CM’s new
nonexperimental analysis of the MTO data suggests a substantial positive
“association” between time spent in low-poverty neighborhoods and adult
economic outcomes which, combined with evidence from other research,
makes it likely that neighborhoods do have important impacts on these
outcomes.
We respectfully disagree with each of the main methodological and
substantive points developed by CM. To date, most of our team’s writings
on MTO have focused on presenting and interpreting the main experi-
mental impacts of the demonstration.
2 We have not discussed in print any
of the broader questions raised by CM’s article about alternative research
methodologies or more fundamental implications of the MTO evaluation
for theories of neighborhood effects. So we are grateful to the editor of
AJS for giving us the opportunity to discuss these issues.
In what follows, we address three main points. First, we clarify what
can and cannot be learned from a randomized policy experiment with
partial compliance. We show that features of MTO that lead to what CM
describe as “selection bias” do not bias estimates from a properly executed
experimental analysis of the MTO data. Their claim seems to reﬂect some
misunderstanding about the calculation of experimental estimatesorwhat
is conventionally meant by selection bias. We focus on two types of es-
timates that follow from MTO’s experimental design—termed “intent to
treat” and “treatment on the treated” in the experimental literature.
Roughly speaking, the MTO intent-to-treat (ITT) effect on a given out-
come is the simple difference between the outcome for all individuals
assigned at random to MTO’s experimental condition, regardless of
whether they “complied” by actually moving through MTO to a low-
poverty neighborhood, and the outcome for all individuals assigned to
the control group. In contrast, the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) esti-
mates are of outcome differences for families actually moving in con-
junction with the program. We show that neither ITT nor TOT estimates
are biased by the fact that only some families moved through MTO or
by the fact that not all movers stayed in low-poverty areas. Both esti-
mators are informative about the existence of neighborhood effects on
behavior, contrary to the distinction CM make between estimating “policy
treatment effects” and “neighborhood effects.”
2 For results derived from the interim MTO evaluation, see Orr et al. (2003), Kling,
Ludwig and Katz (2005), Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006), Kling et al. (2007), and Ludwig
and Kling (2007). Various members of our team were also involved in studying MTO
participants from individual demonstration sites over the short term (see Katz, Kling,
and Liebman 2001;Ludwig, Duncan, andHirschﬁeld2001;Ludwig,Ladd,andDuncan
2001; and Ludwig, Duncan, and Pinkston 2005).MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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Second, we discuss whether the neighborhood differences generated by
MTO are large enough to tell us anything useful about neighborhood
effects. We show that CM’s classiﬁcation of neighborhoods into “low” and
“high” poverty groups on the basis of a single 20% poverty rate threshold
overstates the degree to which subsequent mobility by families moving
through the MTO program waters down the MTO “treatment dose.”
Despite subsequent mobility, the average neighborhood environments of
families moving through the program differed greatly from the neigh-
borhoods of their control-group counterparts in terms of neighborhood
socioeconomic status (SES), crime, and collective efﬁcacy, but not in terms
of race.
What to make of the limited MTO impacts on neighborhood racial
integration? CM argue that because these new communities are lower
poverty but still overwhelmingly minority, they should not be expected
to change the behavioral outcomes of MTO families. This claim seems
inconsistent with the original theories of neighborhood effects that mo-
tivated the MTO experiment, such as that of Wilson (1987), and also with
evidence of sizable MTO impacts on other important outcomes, including
mental health, some indicators of physical health, and violent behavior
among adolescents (Kling et al. 2005; Kling et al. 2007). Perhaps one might
argue that moving to a neighborhood that is both low poverty and ma-
jority white non-Hispanic is particularly important for improving eco-
nomic outcomes. But that argument is inconsistent with CM’s new
nonexperimental estimates, which, if taken at face value, suggest that the
effects on economic outcomes of living in segregated versus integrated
low-poverty tracts are indistinguishable.
The third point of our article is to consider whether anything useful
can be learned about neighborhood effects from the new nonexperimental
estimates presented by CM. The answer, in our judgment, is no. We are
sympathetic to CM’s goal of understanding how the effects of MTO vary
by time spent in low-poverty neighborhoods. In any experiment, some
subjects will beneﬁt more than others. Understanding how and why ben-
eﬁts vary across program participants can help inform policy design. But
CM’s approach reintroduces all of the selection problems that MTO’s
randomization was designed to overcome.
Even taken at face value, the associations CM document areoverstated,
because their analysis confounds cohort and time effects with neighbor-
hood effects, and they perform the wrong hypothesis test for determining
whether extra time spent in a low- rather than high-poverty areaimproves
adult economic outcomes. CM measure economic outcomes at a single
point in time using data from the interim MTO survey. Random assign-
ment occurred over the four-year period between 1994 and 1998. Our
previous work suggests that earlier cohorts of movers may have beneﬁtedAmerican Journal of Sociology
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more than later cohorts with respect to some outcomes, even when time
since random assignment is held constant. Because CM’s key explanatory
variable is the number of months spent in a low-poverty census tract,
their analysis confounds differences in neighborhood effects by random-
ization cohort with changes in impacts by time spent in low-poverty areas.
We show that when we replicatetheiranalysisbutcontrolfortotalnumber
of months between random assignment and the time of the interim survey,
there is no evidence that extra time spent in low-poverty integrated neigh-
borhoods improves economic outcomes, while the estimated effectsoftime
in low-poverty segregated neighborhoods are quite small. We also ﬁnd
no evidence that living in low-poverty neighborhoods in general (pooling
segregated and integrated areas together) improves economic outcomes.
We do not mean to imply that we oppose any attempt to go beyond a
pure experimental ITT or TOT estimate of MTO’s impact. On the con-
trary, we believe there can be great value in such analyses, but only as
long as they are carried out in a way that still capitalizes to the greatest
extent possible on the strengths of MTO’s experimental design. We pro-
vide an example of an instrumental variables (IV) analysis of the effect
of neighborhood poverty on employment that takes advantage of MTO
random assignment.
More deﬁnitive evidence on the connection between time spent in low-
poverty neighborhoods and economic outcomes will require longer-term
follow-up data on MTO participants as well as analyses that exploit the
random assignment design of the MTO experiment. That is the plan for
the long-term evaluation of MTO that is currently under way. We look
forward to sharing these data and results in the future with members of
the research and policy communities interested in neighborhood effects.
AVOIDING SELECTION BIAS USING RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we review the main challenges associated with identifying
causal neighborhood effects on behavior and then discuss what random-
ized mobility experiments can—and cannot—accomplish. CM’s article
introduces some confusion about the proper interpretation of published
MTO estimates because it repeatedly refers to “sources of selection bias”
in the experiment, caused by the failure of some families to move through
the MTO program or to stay in low-poverty areas. We now discuss why
a properly conducted experimental analysis of neighborhood effects using
MTO data does not suffer from selection bias.MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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Challenges to Nonexperimental Estimation
Nonexperimental analyses of neighborhood effects using data on individ-
uals typically proceed by regressing an outcome of interest on measures
of a given person’s neighborhood and individual characteristics.
3 Out-
comes that have been studied in this way range from earnings to teen
childbearing and frequency of asthma attacks (see, e.g., Jencks and Mayer
1990; Aber, Brooks-Gunn, and Duncan1997;LeventhalandBrooks-Gunn
2000; Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002; Ellen and Turner
2003). The neighborhood variables tend to be those easily measured from
the decennial census, such as census tract–level poverty rates or %mi-
nority, although in some cases extraordinary data collectioneffortsprovide
additional measures of such key constructs as neighborhood collective
efﬁcacy (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). Individual-level control
variables include standard demographic characteristics such as age, ed-
ucation, and race, but may also include more detailed measures of family
functioning.
The key problem plaguing nonexperimental approaches is classic omit-
ted-variable bias: people choose or in other ways end up in neighborhoods
for reasons that are difﬁcult to measure and that may also correlate with
their outcomes. Neighborhood selection bias is difﬁcult to avoid with
nonexperimental analysis, because there will inevitably be individual
characteristics left out of the regression that affect the outcome variable
and that may also be related to neighborhood sorting. For example, a
person’s level of competence or initiative may affect labor-market out-
comes. If these factors also help determine where a person lives but are
omitted, then the estimated coefﬁcient on the neighborhood variable will
reﬂect not only the impact of the neighborhood on the outcome but also
the impact of the omitted variables that are correlated with both the
neighborhood variable and the outcome. If unmeasured initiative both
causes a person to ﬁnd an apartment in a better neighborhood and boosts
earnings, then the estimated impact of neighborhood conditions on earn-
ings will be overstated.
But downward bias is possible as well. For example, if parents of a
child with learning disabilities move to a higher-income neighborhood in
the hope of receiving better special-needs services but the researcher fails
3 Alternative approaches include attempts to estimate the scope of neighborhood effects
using, e.g., correlations in outcomes among children or adults growing up or living in
the same neighborhood (Solon, Page, and Duncan 2000), excess variation across areas
in outcomes beyond what can be explained by variation in observable individual
background characteristics (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 1996), or differences
in the size of the individual- vs. aggregate-data elasticity of some behavior to some
measure of incentives or information (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 2003).American Journal of Sociology
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to measure the child’s history of learning disabilities, then the child’s
attainment may in fact be boosted by the move but still be lower than
observationally similar children whose families did not move to better
neighborhoods. In this case, the estimated impact of neighborhood con-
ditions on educational outcomes would be understated.
Thus the curse of omitted-variable bias owing to neighborhood selec-
tion: neither the magnitude nor even the direction of selection bias is
certain. So we cannot even bound the true neighborhood effect from
nonexperimental estimates that are susceptible to selection bias.
The use of longitudinal data to control for unobserved individual- or
family-level time-invariant factors, through either standard panel-data
ﬁxed-effects models or their close cousins in the hierarchical linear model
(HLM) realm, does not solve these problems. Fixed-effects or trajectory
models identify neighborhood effects for subjects who change neighbor-
hood residence over time. But if, say, families move from high- to low-
poverty areas in response to changes in hard-to-measure family circum-
stances related to initiative, children’s learning needs, or other factors,
then selection biases persist.
Although these selection concerns are well known, the standard non-
experimental approach remains the workhorse research design in theﬁeld.
The obvious reasons are the ready availability of nonexperimental na-
tional surveys and the dearth of public-use data from randomized ex-
periments. A growing number of social science studies rely on identifying
“natural experiments” that generate plausibly exogenous variation in in-
dependent variables of interest, but this approach has proved challenging
in the case of neighborhood environments.
A second problem that plagues the nonexperimental literature is our
lack of knowledge of which neighborhood characteristics matter for a
particular outcome, in addition to our inability in most data setstocapture
anything other than the coarsest measures of neighborhood environments.
Suppose it is the poverty rate in a person’s apartment building, and not
in the rest of the census tract, that determines outcomes. Or suppose the
job network to which a person is exposed is a function of the number of
different employers employing not only people in that person’s census
tract but also people at that person’s church. If we put the wrong neigh-
borhood characteristic on the right-hand side of the regression, we could
erroneously conclude that neighborhood effects do not matter. This is a
particularly difﬁcult challenge in nonexperimental research, because the
speciﬁc neighborhood variables that will be most important, and even
the relevant geographic or social deﬁnition of “neighborhood,” may de-
pend on the speciﬁc outcome that is being studied.MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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What a Randomized Intervention Can Achieve
A randomized mobility intervention that induces otherwise identical
groups of people to live, on average, in different types of neighborhoods
solves both problems with respect to detecting the existence of neighbor-
hood effects on the outcomes of interest. Randomization eliminates the
need to correctly specify which neighborhood characteristic matters for
each outcome to learn about whether neighborhoods matter. A mobility
intervention changes an entire bundle of neighborhood characteristics,
and the total impact of changing this entire bundle on any outcome can
be estimated even if the researcher does not know which neighborhood
variables matter. Randomization also solves the selection problem, by
causing the variation in neighborhood of residence to occur for reasons
that are uncorrelated with individual characteristics, whether or not those
characteristics are measurable. In the following discussion, we emphasize
intuition over precision. But since part of our disagreement with CM
stems from differences in what we mean by the term “selection bias,” we
include a more formal development of these issues in the appendix.
Our main experimental results come from comparing the outcomes of
all of the families randomized into the treatment group with those of all
of the families randomized into the control group (i.e., ITT analysis).
4
Because randomization ensures that the families in the two groups would
have had, on average, identical outcomes in the absence of the experi-
mental intervention, any differences that occur between the two groups
can be attributed to the experimental intervention, which in this case was
the offer of a geographically restricted housing voucher and housing mo-
bility counseling.
CM wonder how these ITT analyses can be informative about the
existence of neighborhood effects, given the range of neighborhood en-
vironments experienced by families within the MTO experimental group
(p. 128). The key to our experimental evaluations of MTO is that random
assignment to the experimental group generates large differences in av-
erage neighborhood attributes with the control group, as we document
below. If neighborhoods matter, these large differences in average neigh-
borhood attributes should lead to differences in average economic or other
outcomes. So while CM make a distinction between understanding the
4 We refer to the former as, interchangeably,“experimental-group”or“treatment-group”
families. In the MTO experiment there were actually two experimental groups—one
requiredto moveto low-poverty neighborhoodsandtheotherofferedSection8(housing
choice) vouchers. While we initially follow CM in focusing only on the experimental
and control groups, having data on the Section 8 group is of great value, particularly
for efforts to sort out the mechanisms through which MTO inﬂuences economic or
other outcomes, as we discuss further below.American Journal of Sociology
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effects of the MTO “policy treatment” and understanding “neighborhood
effects,” experimental estimates of MTO treatment effects are informative
about the existence of neighborhood effects even when there is variation
in neighborhood environments within the experimental and control
groups.
It is true that the differences in average neighborhood characteristics
between the experimental and control groups are generated by very het-
erogeneous processes. Some experimental-group families used the vouch-
ers they were offered and some did not. Adopting the language of medical
trials, in which people are randomly assigned to take medicines but some
do not obey the doctors’ instructions, socialscientistsstudyingrandomized
experiments call people who take the offered service “compliers”andthose
who do not take advantage of the service “noncompliers.” CM correctly
note that compliance was “highly selective” (p. 138) in the sense that the
compliers and noncompliers are quite different from one another, as we
(Kling et al. 2007) and others (Shroder 2002) have documented in previous
work.
However, CM are mistaken when they claim that partial compliance
in MTO introduces “another potential source of selection bias into the
experiment” (p. 121). Their claim seems to reﬂect some confusion either
about the mechanics of how an ITT estimate is calculated or else about
the meaning of selection bias as conventionally used in social science.
Given this confusion, it might be useful to consider the logic of ITT
estimates more closely.
The fact that only some MTO families assigned to the experimental
group comply with their treatment assignment and relocate through the
program does not introduce any selection bias to an estimate of the effects
of being offered MTO vouchers, because the control group is compara-
ble—it contains both individuals who would have complied, had they
had been offered the treatment, and individuals who would not have
complied. Similarly, the fact that some MTO compliers move on from
their placement neighborhoods, sometimes even to poorer communities,
does not introduce any selection bias into our ITT estimates because the
control group also contains people who would have made subsequent
moves had they been offered the treatment. By comparing all members
of the treatment group to all members of the control group, ITT estimates
avoid selection bias.
ITT estimates are directly relevant for public policy because mobility
programs that are likely to be implemented presumably will also be vol-
untary, so noncompliance is inevitable. Few (if any) social programs are
taken up by everyone who is eligible (see Mofﬁtt 2003). Nevertheless, for
both scientiﬁc reasons (to understand the direct causal effect of location
on outcomes) and policy reasons (to allow extrapolation to other mobilityMTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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programs and settings where compliance rates may be different), it would
be desirable to have an estimate of the impact of moving per se. The
conceptual obstacle to coming up with such an estimate is that while we
can observe which members of the experimental group are compliers, we
cannot directly observe which members of the control group would have
been compliers had they been offered the treatment. Since compliers and
noncompliers differ, it would not be appropriate to compare the outcomes
of compliers to the outcomes of all members of the control group.
Remarkably, it turns out that if we are willing to make some reasonable
additional assumptions, we can in fact use the experimental variation to
estimate the TOT impact—that is, the effect of the intervention on the
subset of treatment group members who complied with the experiment.
The assumptions are that the intervention had no effect on noncompliers
in the treatment group and that the experience of losing the MTO lottery
had no impact on people in the control group.
5 Under these assumptions,
we know that the average outcomes of the noncompliers in the treat-
ment group and of the potential noncompliers in the control group are
the same. Put differently, we know that the experimental impact for the
noncompliers was zero. Thus, under the TOT assumptions, the ITT es-
timate is simply a weighted average of the impact on compliers and the
zero effect on noncompliers—the weights are the portion of the sample
that are compliers and the portion that are noncompliers (Bloom 1984).
This result implies that the TOT impact can be calculated by simply
rescaling the ITT estimate by the program compliance rate.
6 This TOT
estimate represents the impact of the treatment on only those who actually
moved using an MTO voucher and captures the impact of the entire
bundle of changes in neighborhood attributes generated by MTO moves.
5 This would mean that MTO treatment group families were not affected by the
experience of winning the voucher lottery and receiving housing counseling unless they
actually managed to move using an MTO voucher. This assumption is probably not
strictly valid. Some noncompliers may have gained experience in searching for housing
that beneﬁted them later, and some may have been so discouraged by failing to ﬁnd
a unit that it set them back in future housing searches. But if we are willing to assume
that any effect of treatment assignment on noncompliers is modest relative to the
effects of actually complying with treatment, then we can approximate the TOT im-
pact. A similar argument canbemade about theimpactoflosingthelotteryonmembers
of the control group.
6 We deﬁne the “treatment” here as moving with an MTO voucher, andso,bydeﬁnition,
none of the control families are treated. We know that the ITT estimate is a weighted
average of the impact on compliers and noncompliers. Let Pc be the fraction of the
sample that represents compliers. This is a number that can be observed from the
experimental group. Under the TOT assumption, we know that the impact on non-
compliers is zero. Therefore, , and we can estimate the TOT ITT p P TOT (1 P )0 cc
as ITT/Pc. Thus, the TOT is obtained by simply inﬂating the ITT estimate by the
fraction of compliers.American Journal of Sociology
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The TOT estimate is not attenuated, as the ITT estimate is, by zero
effects of the intervention on the noncompliers.
We suspect that what CM might really be trying to say with their
reference to “selection bias” is that the outcomes of a different intervention
in which families were incentivized or compelled to remain indeﬁnitely
in their new low-poverty neighborhoods might produce larger impacts.
Of course, it is always true of any social intervention that a more powerful
intervention could be imagined. Perhaps an involuntary mobility program
that required Chicago public housing families all to move to suburbs like
Wilmette, Illinois (89.7% white, 2.3% poor in the 2000 census), and stay
there forever might have had larger impacts than those observed in the
MTO program.
But perhaps not. There could be costs associated with moving away
from one’s origin neighborhoods, such as lost social networks and difﬁ-
culty integrating into the new community, which would reduce gains
relative to MTO-type moves. Moreover, under the actual MTO demon-
stration, families who were struggling to adapt to their new lower-poverty
areas were able to reoptimize their residential locations by moving again,
which would not be possible in a program that requiredstrugglingfamilies
to stay forever in their placement communities. In any case, the actual
MTO program design is likely to be at least as intensive as any mobility
program that could actually be implemented given current political (and
ethical) constraints.
Internal versus External Validity
Partial compliance with MTO treatment assignment does not threaten
the internal validity of either ITT or TOT estimates. However, it is im-
portant to be clear about the populations to which MTO experimental
estimates can be generalized (i.e., the external validity of MTO estimates).
MTO deﬁned its eligible sample as families with children living in public
housing projects in high-poverty neighborhoods in ﬁve cities (Baltimore,
Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York).
7 Families within this el-
igible population were invited to apply for the program. The available
data suggest that around one-quarter of eligible families applied (Goering
et al. 2003, p. 11). Randomization occurred only among those eligible
families that applied for housing assistance.
Thus MTO data, and both experimental and nonexperimental analyses
of them, are strictly informative only aboutthispopulationsubset—people
7 Families also had to meet several other requirements, including that they be up to
date on their rent payments and that the household not contain anyone with a criminal
record; see Goering, Feins, and Richardson (2003), p. 11.MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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residing in high-rise public housing in high-poverty neighborhoods in the
mid-1990s, who were at least somewhat interested in moving and sufﬁ-
ciently organized to take note of the opportunity and complete an appli-
cation. The MTO results should only be extrapolated to other populations
if the other families, their residential environments, and their motivations
for moving are similar to those of the MTO population. MTO’s TOT
estimates apply to an even narrower (complier) segment of the population.
There is no reason to expect that the noncompliers would have had a
similar effect had they complied—after all, the noncompliers are clearly
different from the compliers in that they did not manage to lease up, and
this difference is unlikely to be due to random chance.
Period effects may also limit the external validity of MTO impact
estimates. The program operated in the late 1990s, a time of low un-
employment and welfare reform. In fact, the employment rates of exper-
imental-group mothers nearly doubled between baseline and the interim
assessment four to seven years later. But employment increased just as
much among the control-group mothers, leaving no experimental em-
ployment differences between the two MTO groups.
8
Interference
A different issue about the MTO experimental results noted by CM is
Sobel’s (2006) concern about interference between MTO program partic-
ipants. The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) introduced
by Rubin (1980) assumes that the effect of some intervention on a given
individual is not related to the treatment assignments of other people (or
observational units). In the context of MTO, this could include effects of
public-housing neighbors’ receiving MTO lottery assignments at baseline
as well as the existence of MTO neighbors in destination neighborhoods.
If this assumption is violated in MTO, then our previous estimates will
be relevant only for other mobility programs with similar types of inter-
actions among residents and compliance rates.
Potential violation of SUTVA is often a concernwithsocialexperiments.
While this cannot be directly tested, two pieces of evidence argue against
the practical importance of this problem in the MTO context. First, most
families that signed up for MTO were socially isolated at baseline: fully
55% of household heads reported on the baseline surveys that they had
no friends in the baseline neighborhood, and 65% reported they had no
8 The large increase in employment rates over time for both MTO experimental- and
control-group mothers reﬂects the particular macroeconomic conditions and policy
changes affecting low-income single mothers in the 1990s as well as typical patterns
of increased employment for mothers after their preschool-aged children enter school.American Journal of Sociology
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family in the neighborhood. Since around one-quarter of eligible families
signed up for MTO, and some public housing residents would not even
have been eligible (e.g., because they did not have children), social inter-
actions among MTO families were probably very limited.
Second, the MTO intervention deliberately aimed to avoid concen-
trating MTO families in new neighborhoods. Maps of MTO relocation
outcomes reveal relatively little clustering of experimental-group families;
across the MTO cities, few census tracts contain more than a few families
moving in conjunction with the MTO program (see Orr et al. 2003, ex-
hibits C2.2–C2.6). Thus, it seems unlikely that there would be a great
deal of contact among program-group families in destination neighbor-
hoods, much less peer effects.
Mechanisms
One legitimate complaint about randomized experiments is that they are
often something of a black box; they are typically used to estimate only
“total effects” of the experimental manipulation but not to shed light on
the mediating mechanisms behind them. But in fact, some of the paths
in mediational models can be estimated from random-assignment vari-
ation. Think of a path model in which MTO effects on maternal em-
ployment operate through maternal mental health; moves out of crime-
ridden neighborhoods reduce depression and enable otherwise
incapacitated women to secure stable employment. MTO’s experimental
design providesunbiased estimatesoftwoofthethreemediationalpaths—
the effects of MTO on employment and mental health—but not of the
effect of mental health on employment.
Of course, it is easy to ﬁxate on the desire to understand behavioral
mechanisms and to lose sight of the ﬁrst-order beneﬁt that randomized
mobility experiments convey: they at least let us answer the key question
of whether neighborhood environments actually exert any sort of causal
effect on individual behavior. Standard nonexperimental studies of the
type described above (and conducted by CM) will usually not be very
informative about even the basic question of how neighborhood envi-
ronments inﬂuence behavioral outcomes of interest, much less about the
behavioral pathways through which these impacts arise.
9
9 Yet another way of uncovering mediational pathways is through open-ended inter-
views with experimental- and control-group families. Using qualitative data from in-
depth, semistructured interviews with 67 participants selected at random in Baltimore,
Turney et al. (2006) ﬁnd evidence consistent with minimal MTO effectsonemployment.
Employed respondents in both the experimental and control groups were heavily con-
centrated in retail and health care jobs. To secure or maintain employment, they relied
heavily on a particular job search strategy: informal referrals from similarly skilledMTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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WAS MTO A WEAK INTERVENTION?
CM’s argument that MTO was a weak intervention for studying neigh-
borhood effects seems to rest on three key propositions: because of partial
compliance, the MTO intervention ended up being a small one; subse-
quent mobility by MTO movers into higher-poverty areas minimized the
amount of neighborhood change experienced even by the MTO compliers;
and the fact that MTO achieved relatively little racial integration means
that we should not expect much in the way of behavioral effects from
this intervention. In this section, we explain why we disagree with each
of these propositions.
At the same time, we also think that some of the translation of the
MTO results into policy debates has been overly negative about the po-
tential of housing vouchers to improve the life chances of low-income
families. One problem is that policy discussions have sometimes treated
all of the statistically insigniﬁcant estimates for MTO as if they were
zeroes, failing to distinguish between results that were precisely estimated
to be close to zero from results for which the conﬁdence intervals were
so large as to include both zero and substantively large effects.
10 A second
difﬁculty is that the signiﬁcant estimated impacts of MTO on mental
health, family safety, and outcomes for adolescents are often ignored in
policy discussions emphasizing the impacts on adult economic self-sufﬁ-
ciency. And of course, the experiment is still ongoing, and there could be
long-run effects that are either bigger or smaller than those that have
been observed to date.
Partial Compliance
Part of CM’s case that MTO is a weak intervention is that “only 47% of
those families assigned to the experimental group actually usedtheirMTO
vouchers” (p. 111). Whether a 47% compliance rate for an ambitious social
and credentialed acquaintances who already held jobs in these sectors. Though ex-
perimentals were more likely to have neighbors who were employed, few of their
neighbors held jobs in these sectors or could provide such referrals. Thus, controls
had an easier time garnering such referrals. Additionally, the conﬁguration of the
metropolitan area’s public transportation routes in relation to the locations of hospitals,
nursing homes, and malls posed additional transportation challenges to experimentals
as they searched for employment—challenges controls were less likely to face.
10 The experimental ITT impact, e.g., on the likelihood that individuals ages 15–19
are “educationally on track” (i.e., in school, or have completed a high school diploma
or GED) is equal to 0.029 (SE p 0.028), compared to a control mean of 0.741 (Orr et
al. 2003, p. 119). This means that we can only rule out an impact that is larger than
11% of the control mean. But an MTO impact on schooling attainment smaller than
11% would still be important for any sort of beneﬁt-cost analysis of MTO, given the
very large social costs associated with school dropout.American Journal of Sociology
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program like MTO should be considered “high” or “low” in some absolute
sense is not obvious. One possible benchmark is Chicago’s Gautreaux
program, which CM discuss as an example of a superior mobility strategy
to MTO on account of the former’s emphasis on achieving racial rather
than socioeconomic integration. But only around 20% of eligible families
who signed up for Gautreaux moved through that program (Rubinowitz
and Rosenbaum 2000, p. 67). Compliance with the experimental-group
voucher offer in MTO was also larger than the planners of MTO antic-
ipated. This caused a change in the random-assignment ratios after the
ﬁrst year of MTO in order to take advantage of the opportunity presented
by high compliance to reduce the experiment’s minimum detectable
effects.
More important, we have already shown that a low compliance rate
by itself does not invalidate the ability of a mobility program to be in-
formative about the existence of neighborhood effects, since TOT esti-
mates isolate the causal effect of the treatment on families who moved
in conjunction with the program. A lower or higher compliance rate sim-
ply affects the scaling factor that we apply to the ITT estimate but does
not bias the TOT value itself.
MTO’s Effects on Neighborhood Environments
CM argue that even families who move in conjunction with the program
do not experience very large, or at least sustained, changes in neighbor-
hood environments, because some families move again after their initial
one-year lease is up.
11 However, the degree to which these voluntary
subsequent moves by MTO compliers reduces the MTO experiment’s
impact on neighborhood environments is overstated by CM’s decision to
classify neighborhoods into just four categories. They assign all census
tracts in which MTO families spent time into four types based on two
dimensions: low versus high poverty (using a threshold of 20%), and
integrated versus segregated (using a threshold of 30% minority, combin-
ing black and Hispanic). Popular discussions of MTO have focused on
the subsequent moves made by MTO compliers that cross CM’s 20%
tract poverty threshold. For example, in a Washington Post article about
MTO, William Julius Wilson noted that “as many as 41 percent of those
who entered low-poverty neighborhoods subsequently moved back to
more-disadvantaged neighborhoods” (Matthews 2007).
11 Families assigned to the experimental group in MTO could redeem their vouchers
only in census tracts with 1990 poverty rates of 10% or less and had to stay there for
at least one year (otherwise, they would lose their vouchers), but after that ﬁrst one-
year lease they were free to relocate elsewhere.MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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By aggregating all census tracts with poverty rates above 20%, CM
miss the fact that very few MTO experimental-group compliers choose
to move back into the highest-poverty areas in which so many of the
control families continued to reside. Four years after random assignment,
only 8% of the experimental-group compliers were living in census tracts
with poverty rates of 40% or more, compared with 52% of the control
group.
12 This is a very large difference.
We believe that a more informative way to examine how MTO changes
diverse dimensions of neighborhood environments for participating fam-
ilies is to calculate ITT and TOT impacts on continuous measures of
neighborhood characteristics. The results shown in table 1 demonstrate
that, despite the fact that only 47% of experimental-group families moved
through MTO, and some then moved back on their own to somewhat
higher-poverty areas over time, very large changes in a wide range of
neighborhood attributes persisted at the time the interim MTO surveys
were conducted. For example, the TOT impact reported in the ﬁrst row
of table 1 shows that at the timeoftheinterimsurvey,theaveragecomplier
in the experimental group lived in a census tract with a poverty rate about
17 percentage points below that of the control group (about 45% of the
control-group mean).
13 The TOT effect on tract share minority is smaller
(by 9.6 percentage points, or about 11% of the control mean). But there
are large TOT effects on other tract sociodemographic attributes, includ-
ing the share of two-parent families (14 percentage points, or about 37%
of the control mean) and the share of tract adults who have more than
a high school education (13 percentage points, or about 42% of the control
mean).
We also see large MTO effects on the types of neighborhood social
processes or institutions that sociologists often emphasize as the key be-
havioral mechanisms behind neighborhood effects on behavior. For ex-
ample, experimental-group compliers are about 27 percentage points less
likely than controls to report that the police do not respond to 911 calls
12 Using the data on addresses six years after baseline that are available for around
two-thirds of the MTO sample, we see only 9% of MTO experimental compliers living
in tracts with poverty rates of 40% or more, compared to 43% of the control group.
If we use a lower threshold for “high-poverty tracts” of 30% poverty rate or more,
four years after random assignment we see 16% of MTO experimental compliers living
in tracts with poverty rates of 30% or more, compared to 73% of the control group.
Six years after random assignment, about 20% of the experimental compliers are in
tracts with poverty rates of 30% or more, compared to 64% of the control group.
13 The most appropriate benchmark for the TOT estimate is actually the average
outcome among those families assigned to the control group who would have moved
had they been assigned to the treatment group, or the “control complier mean” (CCM);
see Katz et al. 2001. However, in practice the CCM is usually fairly close to the overall
control mean, and so for simplicity we focus here on the latter.160
T
A
B
L
E
1
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
M
T
O
o
n
N
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
C
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
a
t
T
i
m
e
o
f
I
n
t
e
r
i
m
S
u
r
v
e
y
(
4
–
7
y
e
a
r
s
a
f
t
e
r
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
)
N
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
-
G
r
o
u
p
M
e
a
n
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
E
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
a
l
/
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
(
I
T
T
)
E
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
a
l
/
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
f
o
r
C
o
m
p
l
i
e
r
s
(
T
O
T
)
C
l
a
s
s
a
n
d
r
a
c
e
(
b
y
t
r
a
c
t
)
:
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
r
a
t
e
(
A
D
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
3
8
6
 
.
0
8
0
*
 
.
1
7
2
*
(
.
0
0
8
)
(
.
0
1
7
)
S
h
a
r
e
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
y
(
A
D
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
8
7
6
 
.
0
4
5
*
 
.
0
9
6
*
(
.
0
0
8
)
(
.
0
1
7
)
S
h
a
r
e
a
d
u
l
t
s
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
(
A
D
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
8
1
0
.
0
3
5
*
.
0
7
5
*
(
.
0
0
4
)
(
.
0
0
8
)
S
h
a
r
e
t
w
o
-
p
a
r
e
n
t
f
a
m
i
l
i
e
s
(
A
D
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
3
8
5
.
0
6
7
*
.
1
4
2
*
(
.
0
0
7
)
(
.
0
1
4
)
S
h
a
r
e
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
w
i
t
h
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
y
o
n
d
h
i
g
h
s
c
h
o
o
l
(
A
D
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
3
0
7
.
0
6
0
*
.
1
2
8
*
(
.
0
0
7
)
(
.
0
1
4
)
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
e
f
ﬁ
c
a
c
y
,
t
r
u
s
t
,
a
n
d
f
r
i
e
n
d
s
(
s
h
a
r
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
)
:
L
i
k
e
l
y
o
r
v
e
r
y
l
i
k
e
l
y
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
s
w
o
u
l
d
d
o
s
o
m
e
t
h
i
n
g
a
b
o
u
t
k
i
d
s
w
r
i
t
i
n
g
g
r
a
f
ﬁ
t
i
o
n
l
o
c
a
l
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
5
4
1
.
1
0
9
*
.
2
3
5
*
(
.
0
2
2
)
(
.
0
4
7
)
L
i
k
e
l
y
o
r
v
e
r
y
l
i
k
e
l
y
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
s
w
o
u
l
d
d
o
s
o
m
e
t
h
i
n
g
a
b
o
u
t
k
i
d
s
s
k
i
p
p
i
n
g
s
c
h
o
o
l
o
r
h
a
n
g
i
n
g
o
u
t
o
n
s
t
r
e
e
t
c
o
r
n
e
r
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
3
6
6
.
1
0
6
*
.
2
2
9
*
(
.
0
2
3
)
(
.
0
4
9
)161
P
e
o
p
l
e
c
a
n
b
e
t
r
u
s
t
e
d
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
9
9
.
0
1
0
.
0
2
0
(
.
0
1
4
)
(
.
0
2
9
)
H
a
v
e
c
o
l
l
e
g
e
-
e
d
u
c
a
t
e
d
f
r
i
e
n
d
s
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
4
1
0
.
0
6
6
*
.
1
4
0
*
(
.
0
2
2
)
(
.
0
4
6
)
H
a
v
e
f
r
i
e
n
d
s
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
$
3
0
,
0
0
0
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
4
2
4
.
0
5
2
*
.
1
1
2
*
(
.
0
2
3
)
(
.
0
4
8
)
V
e
r
y
s
a
t
i
s
ﬁ
e
d
o
r
s
a
t
i
s
ﬁ
e
d
w
i
t
h
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
4
7
5
.
1
3
8
*
.
2
9
3
*
(
.
0
2
2
)
(
.
0
4
7
)
C
r
i
m
e
a
n
d
d
r
u
g
s
(
s
h
a
r
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
)
:
P
o
l
i
c
e
d
o
n
o
t
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
w
h
e
n
c
a
l
l
e
d
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
3
3
7
 
.
1
2
8
*
 
.
2
6
6
*
(
.
0
2
0
)
(
.
0
4
2
)
L
i
t
t
e
r
/
t
r
a
s
h
/
g
r
a
f
ﬁ
t
i
/
a
b
a
n
d
o
n
e
d
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
7
0
4
 
.
1
1
1
*
 
.
2
3
6
*
(
.
0
2
1
)
(
.
0
4
6
)
P
u
b
l
i
c
d
r
i
n
k
i
n
g
/
g
r
o
u
p
s
o
f
p
e
o
p
l
e
h
a
n
g
i
n
g
o
u
t
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
6
9
5
 
.
1
7
0
*
 
.
3
6
0
*
(
.
0
2
2
)
(
.
0
4
6
)
F
e
e
l
s
a
f
e
a
t
n
i
g
h
t
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
5
4
9
.
1
4
2
*
.
3
0
3
*
(
.
0
2
2
)
(
.
0
4
6
)
S
a
w
d
r
u
g
s
i
n
p
a
s
t
3
0
d
a
y
s
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
4
4
5
 
.
1
1
7
*
 
.
2
4
8
*
(
.
0
2
2
)
(
.
0
4
6
)
A
n
y
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
m
e
m
b
e
r
c
r
i
m
e
v
i
c
t
i
m
i
n
l
a
s
t
6
m
o
s
.
(
S
R
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
2
0
9
 
.
0
4
0
*
 
.
0
8
5
*
(
.
0
1
7
)
(
.
0
3
6
)
S
o
u
r
c
e
.
—
O
r
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
)
.
N
o
t
e
s
.
—
S
R
p
s
u
r
v
e
y
r
e
p
o
r
t
;
A
D
p
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
d
a
t
a
.
C
e
n
s
u
s
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
2
0
0
0
a
r
e
u
s
e
d
t
o
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
t
r
a
c
t
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
f
o
r
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
o
f
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
c
e
a
t
t
i
m
e
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
i
m
s
u
r
v
e
y
.
N
u
m
b
e
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
a
r
e
S
E
s
.
*
.
P
!
.
0
5American Journal of Sociology
162
for service, which is nearly 80% of the control-group mean. Experimental
compliers are much less likely than controls to report that their neigh-
borhoods are plagued by social disorder, as indicated by litter, grafﬁti,
public drinking, or groups hanging out at night in public spaces. Exper-
imental-group compliers are in turn much more likely than controls to
indicate that they feel safe at nightin their neighborhood(by30percentage
points, about 55% of the control mean) and are less likely to indicate that
anyone in the household was victimized by a crime in the past six months
(by nearly 9 percentage points, or about two-ﬁfths of the control mean).
Informal social control seems to be more common in the neighborhoods
in which the experimental-group families reside four to seven years after
random assignment. Although experimental adults are not more likely
than controls to report that they think, in general, that people can be
trusted (responses by both groups suggest low levels of trust), adults in
the experimental group are more likely to have college-educated friends
or friends who earn more than $30,000 per year.
Note again that we are measuring neighborhood characteristics in table
1 at the time of the interim surveys (four to seven years after random
assignment) using either survey reports or data from the 2000 census.
Because some of the neighborhoods experimental-group families moved
into were deteriorating from 1990 to 2000, and some MTO families moved
again on their own, MTO’s impacts on the average neighborhood envi-
ronment families experienced from baseline to the time of these surveys
are even larger than table 1 would suggest.
It is hard to think of any larger randomized social policy intervention
than MTO. MTO families were assisted in moving from some of the most
violent and distressed housing projects in America. This was not a pro-
gram that simply offered short-term job training, like the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) programs (Bloom et al. 1996; Orr et al. 1996);
changed health insurance co-payment rates, like the RAND health ex-
periment (Newhouse and IEG 1993); or helped with interview skills, like
the job-search assistance experiments. The living arrangements for people
who moved through MTO were fundamentally transformed for years.
The Role of Neighborhood Racial Integration
While CM acknowledge that MTO helped experimental-group compliers
move to neighborhoods that were less disadvantaged and dangerous along
many dimensions, they argue that MTO provides a weak test of neigh-
borhood effects because of its relatively limited impact on racial integra-
tion. “MTO shufﬂed families around within the conﬁnes of racially seg-
regated neighborhoods, exposing them to a limited range of resources and
opportunities” (pp. 137–38) and so “stacked the deck againstﬁndingneigh-MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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borhood effects” (p. 116). Even MTO experimental-group compliers con-
tinued to live in census tracts that were lower poverty but still heavily
minority.
But the argument that mobility programs that achieve social class in-
tegration must also necessarily achieve racial integration in order to
change behavior would appear to be inconsistent with the inﬂuential
theoretical model developed by Wilson (1987). The precipitating event in
the Wilson model is the ﬂight of black working- and middle-class families
during the 1960s and 1970s, a “profound social transformation” that con-
tributed to high prevalence rates among the remaining families of crime,
out-of-wedlock births, female-headed families, and welfare dependency
(Wilson 1987, p. 49). In Wilson’s model, the exodus of middle- and work-
ing-class families was particularly important because thesefamiliesserved
as “a social buffer,” as “mainstream role models that help keep alive the
perception that education is meaningful, that steady employment is a
viable alternative to welfare, and that family stability is the norm, not
the exception” (Wilson 1987, p. 49). MTO as implemented would seem
to provide an almost perfect test of this theory—it helped families move
out of some of the most unsafe neighborhoods in America into neigh-
borhoods with substantial shares of middle-class minority residents who
could potentially serve as role models.
CM’s argument that large changes in both neighborhood racial com-
position and social class composition are necessary to change behavior is
also inconsistent with our ﬁndings of MTO impacts on a number of key
outcomes besides economic self-sufﬁciency. For example, adults assigned
to the MTO experimental rather than the control group reported large
improvements in mental health; the ITT impact on Kessler’s K-6 index
of psychological distress (which is the fraction of six questions about
psychological distress that the respondent answered in the afﬁrmative) is
equal to around  0.1 standard deviations, with a TOT impact of  0.2
standard deviations—about the same magnitude change in mental health
outcomes as results from current best-practice antidepressant drug treat-
ment (Kling et al. 2007, pp. 92, 102). The MTO impact on the K-6 mental
health index for young females is even larger, with ITT and TOT esti-
mates equal to  0.29 and  0.59 standard deviations, respectively. During
the ﬁrst few years after random assignment, MTO reduced the number
of arrests of young females by nearly half and even for young males
reduced the number of arrests for violent crimes by more than one-third
(Kling et al. 2005, p. 104).
It is true that after a few years, young males assigned to the experi-
mental group wind up with worse outcomes than those assigned to theAmerican Journal of Sociology
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control group.
14 For policy purposes, we would hope for positive effects
rather than these large adverse effects on many outcomes for young males.
But the fact that even the adverse responses of some young males to MTO
are so large seems inconsistent with the characterization of MTO as a
“weak intervention.”
15
Additional evidence against CM’s claim that racial integration is a
necessary condition for changing economic outcomes comes from their
own estimates. For example, estimates presented in their table 5 indicate
that each additional month spent in a low-poverty integrated neighbor-
hood increases employment rates by 1.1 percentage points, and each extra
month spent in a low-poverty segregated neighborhood increases em-
ployment rates by 1.1 percentage points. This is not a verylargedifference.
The estimated effects in CM’s study of spending more time in a low-
poverty integrated neighborhood versus a low-poverty segregated neigh-
borhood are also quite similar for weekly earnings (1.89 vs. 1.53; SE p
0.91 and 0.81, respectively), use of TANF (Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families) ( 0.009 vs.  0.008; SE p 0.006 and 0.005), and food
stamp use ( 0.015 vs.  0.014; SE p 0.005 and 0.004). Moreover, as we
demonstrate below, CM’s estimates of the effects of time spent in low-
poverty integrated areas are sensitive to their speciﬁc modeling and es-
timation decisions.
CM suggest that corroborating evidence for the importance of inte-
grating by race as well as by social class in order to inﬂuence adult
economic outcomes can be found in the Chicago Gautreaux program,
which placed families in neighborhoods on the basis of race rather than
class. Rosenbaum (1995) reports that around 64% of adults who moved
to the suburbs through Gautreaux were employed at the time of a 1988
survey (around ﬁve to six years after initial Gautreaux placements), com-
pared with about 51% of city movers. But the differenceinresultsbetween
MTO and Gautreaux could also be explained by potential selection prob-
lems with evaluations of the Gautreaux program.
14 For instance, administrative arrest histories show that, three to four years after
random assignment, the experimental ITT impact on property crime arrests is equal
to 0.038 more arrests per male youth per year, nearly half the control mean (Kling et
al. 2005, p. 104). The MTO interim survey data, collected on average about ﬁve years
after random assignment, show an experimental ITT impact on the share of young
males reporting a nonsports accident or injury in the past year of 9 percentage points
(about 150% of the control mean), while the experimental ITT impact on smoking in
the past 30 days is 10 percentage points, over 80% of the control mean (Kling et al.
2007, p. 92).
15 It is also true that MTO wound up generating relatively modest changes in access
to jobs (Kling et al. 2007). While this mechanism is central to “spatial mismatch”
theories (Kain 1968), it is not central to many of the key theories emphasized by
sociologists as to why neighborhoods might affect economic outcomes.MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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Gautreaux was not a randomized experiment in which some families
received the Gautreaux offer and others did not. Families in Gautreaux
were offered rental units by the nonproﬁt agency running the program
in the order in which they were assigned to the waiting list. A common
claim is that Gautreaux families accepted the ﬁrst or second rental unit
offered to them by the local nonproﬁt agency, but documentation of this
offer-and-accept process is not available, and so there remains some ques-
tion about the possibility of selection into suburban rather than urban
neighborhoods. Rosenbaum’s (1995) results for effects on adult labor mar-
ket outcomes, based on comparisons between suburban and city movers,
are drawn from a follow-up survey of Gautreaux movers with a response
rate of 59%. Mendenhall, DeLuca, and Duncan (2006) use administrative
data on Gautreaux families to overcome problems of selective survey
sample attrition and ﬁnd no detectable differences in economic outcomes
between city and suburban movers, although they do ﬁnd signs of rela-
tively small associations between some speciﬁc socioeconomic or racial
neighborhood characteristics and economic outcomes. But all of these
results are difﬁcult to interpret, given evidence of an association between
placement neighborhoods and baseline family and origin-neighborhood
attributes.
16
In sum, it may be true that residential integration by race is particularly
important for some behavioral outcomes, including violentbehavior(Lud-
wig and Kling 2007). But there is not a very strong empirical basis at
present for suggesting that a large change in neighborhood racial com-
position is a necessary condition for affecting behavioral outcomes. To
the contrary, there is strong evidence from our own experimental analysis
of MTO that the intervention was in fact powerful enough to yield large
changes in a number of key outcomes aside from adult economic self-
sufﬁciency.
WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM CM’S NEW ESTIMATES?
We have argued above that CM are wrong in claiming that our previous
experimental ITT and TOT estimates from the MTO data are uninform-
ative about the existence of neighborhood effects. Nevertheless, we are
sympathetic to CM’s goal of trying to learn more about who beneﬁts the
16 Mendenhall et al. (2006) ﬁnd that, compared to suburban movers, city movers in
Gautreaux have slightly older children (measured by age of youngest child), are more
likely to live in public housing at baseline, and generally come from more disadvan-
taged and dangerous baseline neighborhoods. Votruba and Kling (2004) also ﬁnd evi-
dence for an association between baseline characteristics and placement neighborhood
outcomes.American Journal of Sociology
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most from MTO and why, and so in this section we consider the question
of how much useful information their nonexperimental estimates con-
tribute to our understanding of neighborhood effects. Unfortunately, our
conclusion is that they do not contributemuch. Themostimportantreason
is that their nonexperimental cross-section regression estimates are likely
to be affected by selection bias. Anotherreason isthattheirresearchdesign
confounds treatment effect differences by random assignment cohort with
differences in time spent in low-poverty neighborhoods. We also dem-
onstrate that even if we ignore these two signiﬁcant problems, their ﬁnd-
ings that adult labor market outcomes are improved by additional time
spent in low-poverty integrated neighborhoods appears to be sensitive to
their speciﬁc modeling and estimation decisions.
Replicating CM’s Estimates
We begin by replicating CM’s estimates using their model speciﬁcation
and version of the MTO data set, which they generously shared with us.
Before presenting these results, we ﬁrst brieﬂy review their estimation
framework. CM’s main estimates for neighborhood “associations” are
shown in their tables 5 and 6. The key explanatory variables are measures
of months of exposure to low-poverty integrated, low-poverty segregated,
and poor neighborhoods. They also control for indicators for assignment
group and compliance status (i.e., variables indicating experimental non-
compliers and experimental compliers), as well as a standard set of base-
line characteristics that we have used in our own previous research, in-
cluding the adult’s own sociodemographic characteristics and baseline
employment status.
As shown in the top row of table 2, we are able to reproduce their
point estimates and standard errors almost exactly for three of the four
outcomes they examine: employed at the time of the MTO interim survey,
TANF receipt, and food stamp receipt. Our estimates differ from theirs
for weekly earnings because we estimate models for all four outcomes
using sampling weights that adjust for the fact that there was a change
during the course of theMTOstudy periodintheprobabilitythatenrollees
would be assigned to each of the three mobility groups in the demon-
stration. CM use these sampling weights for their estimates for employ-
ment, TANF receipt, and food stamp receipt, but they estimate weekly
earnings without weights.
17 We follow CM’s convention of showing actual
logit or Tobit coefﬁcients and standard errors, although our own pref-
erence would have been to show the results in a way that makes it easier
17 When we estimate the model without weights, we can replicate their unweighted
estimates exactly.MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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to understand the magnitude of the estimated effects—for example, for
the dichotomous dependent variables we would have shown either odds
ratios or, better still, average marginal effects.
18
Note that our indications of statistical signiﬁcance do not quite match
theirs (e.g., with TANF receipt), because CM are calculating P values
using one-tailed t-tests. We instead use P values calculated from two-
tailed t-tests, since much of the theoretical work in this area suggests the
possibility of adverse effects of MTO moves on behavioral outcomes
(Jencks and Mayer 1990; Luttmer 2005). The fact that assignment to the
MTO experimental rather than the control group has, on balance, det-
rimental effects for young males by the time of the interim survey would
seem to justify this decision.
A different concern with CM’s statistical tests is that they seem to be
using the wrong null hypothesis for testing whether there are neighbor-
hood effects on economic outcomes. By neighborhood effect, we usually
mean that time spent in a less disadvantaged neighborhood has more
beneﬁcial impacts on behavioral outcomes of interest than does time spent
in a relatively more disadvantaged neighborhood. CM’s claim for an
association between low-poverty neighborhoods and economic outcomes
is derived from testing whether the estimated coefﬁcients for the effects
of months in a low-poverty integrated or segregated census tract are dif-
ferent from zero. But given that the counterfactual of interest here is time
spent in a high-poverty rather than low-poverty area, we should be testing
whether the coefﬁcients for time in low-poverty integrated or segregated
tracts are different from the coefﬁcient for time in high-poverty tracts.
We present the result of these tests in part A of table 2; we ﬁnd that at
the usual 5% cutoff we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effects of
living in low-poverty integrated neighborhoods are the same as those of
living in high-poverty neighborhoods. Extra exposure to low-poverty seg-
regated areas boosts employment rates and reduces food stamp receipt,
but it has no signiﬁcant effect on earnings or TANF receipt.
During the course of working with CM’s data, we realized that they
handle missing values among the MTO baseline control variables in a
different way from our own team’s standard practice when analyzing
MTO data. Speciﬁcally, for familiesmissingvaluesforanybaselinecontrol
variables, we either impute values or include missing-data indicators for
18 Most software packages calculate marginal effects (dp/dx) at the mean values of the
control variables. This can be problematic in cases such as MTO, where many of our
right-hand-side variables are dichotomous, and so no one in the MTO sample is at
the means. We instead calculate the marginal effects for everyone in the MTO sample
and then take the average of these marginal effects (see Chamberlain [1984, p. 1274]
for a conceptual discussion; for calculating the average marginal effects in Stata, see
Bartus [2005]).168
T
A
B
L
E
2
R
e
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
a
n
d
E
x
t
e
n
d
i
n
g
C
M
’
s
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
f
o
r
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
T
i
m
e
i
n
L
o
w
-
a
n
d
H
i
g
h
-
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
T
r
a
c
t
s
o
n
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
W
e
e
k
l
y
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
T
A
N
F
R
e
c
e
i
p
t
F
o
o
d
S
t
a
m
p
R
e
c
e
i
p
t
A
.
C
M
s
a
m
p
l
e
,
C
M
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
:
P
o
i
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
n
d
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
:
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
1
1
†
(
.
0
0
6
)
1
.
4
7
(
.
9
1
)
 
.
0
0
9
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
.
0
1
5
*
(
.
0
0
6
)
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
s
e
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
d
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
1
1
*
(
.
0
0
5
)
.
9
4
(
.
8
1
)
 
.
0
0
8
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
.
0
1
4
*
(
.
0
0
5
)
H
i
g
h
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
0
5
(
.
0
0
4
)
.
3
2
(
.
7
3
)
 
.
0
0
3
(
.
0
0
5
)
 
.
0
0
9
*
(
.
0
0
4
)
x
2
t
e
s
t
s
a
n
d
P
:
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
v
s
.
h
i
g
h
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
.
4
2
(
P
p
.
1
5
)
1
.
8
0
(
P
p
.
0
7
)
 
1
.
1
2
(
P
p
.
2
6
)
 
1
.
5
5
(
P
p
.
1
2
)
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
s
e
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
d
v
s
.
h
i
g
h
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
.
.
.
.
.
.
2
.
0
4
(
P
p
.
0
4
)
1
.
3
0
(
P
p
.
2
0
)
 
1
.
4
5
(
P
p
.
1
5
)
 
2
.
0
8
(
P
p
.
0
4
)
N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
2
,
2
9
3
2
,
1
6
6
2
,
2
8
7
2
,
2
9
2
B
.
N
B
E
R
s
a
m
p
l
e
,
C
M
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
:
P
o
i
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
n
d
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
:
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
0
9
†
(
.
0
0
5
)
1
.
2
8
(
.
8
7
)
 
.
0
1
1
†
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
.
0
1
8
*
(
.
0
0
6
)
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
s
e
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
d
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
1
0
*
(
.
0
0
5
)
1
.
0
4
(
.
7
7
)
 
.
0
1
0
*
(
.
0
0
5
)
 
.
0
1
6
*
(
.
0
0
5
)
H
i
g
h
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
0
4
(
.
0
0
4
)
.
3
8
(
.
6
9
)
 
.
0
0
6
(
.
0
0
5
)
 
.
0
1
1
*
(
.
0
0
4
)
x
2
t
e
s
t
s
a
n
d
P
:
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
v
s
.
h
i
g
h
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
.
2
7
(
P
p
.
2
1
)
1
.
4
6
(
P
p
.
1
4
)
 
1
.
3
5
(
P
p
.
1
8
)
 
1
.
6
5
(
P
p
.
1
0
)
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
s
e
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
d
v
s
.
h
i
g
h
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
.
.
.
.
.
.
2
.
0
8
(
P
p
.
0
4
)
1
.
4
0
(
P
p
.
1
6
)
 
1
.
4
6
(
P
p
.
1
4
)
 
1
.
7
9
(
P
p
.
0
7
)
N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
2
,
5
2
3
2
,
3
8
4
2
,
5
1
7
2
,
5
2
2169
C
.
N
B
E
R
s
a
m
p
l
e
,
N
B
E
R
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
:
P
o
i
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
n
d
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
:
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
0
7
(
.
0
0
6
)
1
.
0
3
(
1
.
0
1
)
 
.
0
0
8
(
.
0
0
7
)
 
.
0
1
5
*
(
.
0
0
7
)
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
s
e
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
d
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
1
0
*
(
.
0
0
5
)
1
.
1
2
(
.
7
5
)
 
.
0
1
1
*
(
.
0
0
5
)
 
.
0
1
7
*
(
.
0
0
5
)
H
i
g
h
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
0
4
(
.
0
0
4
)
.
3
8
(
.
6
9
)
 
.
0
0
6
(
.
0
0
5
)
 
.
0
1
2
*
(
.
0
0
4
)
x
2
t
e
s
t
s
a
n
d
P
:
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
v
s
.
h
i
g
h
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
5
7
(
P
p
.
5
7
)
.
8
0
(
P
p
.
4
2
)
 
.
3
3
(
P
p
.
7
4
)
 
.
5
8
(
P
p
.
5
6
)
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
s
e
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
d
v
s
.
h
i
g
h
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
.
.
.
.
.
.
2
.
2
3
(
P
p
.
0
3
)
1
.
6
5
(
P
p
.
1
0
)
 
1
.
7
5
(
P
p
.
0
8
)
 
2
.
1
4
(
P
p
.
0
3
)
N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
2
,
5
2
3
2
,
3
8
4
2
,
5
1
7
2
,
5
2
2
D
.
N
B
E
R
s
a
m
p
l
e
,
N
B
E
R
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
,
N
B
E
R
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
P
o
i
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
n
d
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
:
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
0
2
(
.
0
0
5
)
.
5
7
(
.
8
0
)
 
.
0
0
2
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
.
0
0
3
(
.
0
0
6
)
L
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
s
e
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
d
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
0
6
*
(
.
0
0
3
)
.
6
6
(
.
4
4
)
 
.
0
0
5
†
(
.
0
0
3
)
 
.
0
0
6
*
(
.
0
0
3
)
T
o
t
a
l
m
o
n
t
h
s
f
r
o
m
r
a
n
d
o
m
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
t
o
i
n
t
e
r
i
m
s
u
r
v
e
y
t
i
m
e
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
0
9
*
(
.
0
0
4
)
1
.
2
2
*
(
.
7
2
)
 
.
0
1
0
*
(
.
0
0
5
)
 
.
0
1
5
*
(
.
0
0
4
)
N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
2
,
5
2
3
2
,
3
8
4
2
,
5
1
7
2
,
5
2
2
N
o
t
e
s
.
—
N
u
m
b
e
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
a
r
e
S
E
s
,
e
x
c
e
p
t
a
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
.
E
a
c
h
p
a
r
t
o
f
t
h
e
t
a
b
l
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
t
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
f
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
n
g
a
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
l
o
g
i
t
(
ﬁ
r
s
t
,
t
h
i
r
d
,
a
n
d
f
o
u
r
t
h
c
o
l
s
.
)
o
r
T
o
b
i
t
(
s
e
c
o
n
d
c
o
l
.
)
u
s
i
n
g
a
d
u
l
t
s
i
n
t
h
e
M
T
O
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
a
l
a
n
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
g
r
o
u
p
s
.
T
h
e
C
M
s
a
m
p
l
e
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
a
f
e
w
h
u
n
d
r
e
d
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
a
l
-
a
n
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
-
g
r
o
u
p
s
u
r
v
e
y
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
w
h
o
m
d
a
t
a
o
n
s
o
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
w
e
r
e
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
;
t
h
e
N
B
E
R
s
a
m
p
l
e
i
m
p
u
t
e
s
v
a
l
u
e
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
s
e
c
o
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
s
t
o
t
h
o
s
e
c
a
s
e
s
o
r
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
d
a
t
a
-
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
.
T
h
e
C
M
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
“
l
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
”
t
r
a
c
t
s
a
s
t
h
o
s
e
w
i
t
h
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
b
e
l
o
w
2
0
%
,
l
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
3
0
%
A
f
r
i
c
a
n
-
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
s
,
a
n
d
l
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
3
0
%
H
i
s
p
a
n
i
c
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
s
;
t
h
e
N
B
E
R
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
l
o
w
-
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
a
s
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
b
e
l
o
w
2
0
%
a
n
d
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
%
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
y
b
e
l
o
w
3
0
%
.
T
h
e
ﬁ
r
s
t
r
o
w
i
s
i
n
t
e
n
d
e
d
t
o
r
e
p
l
i
c
a
t
e
t
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
i
n
C
M
’
s
t
a
b
l
e
s
5
a
n
d
6
.
T
h
e
w
e
e
k
l
y
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
i
n
t
h
e
s
e
c
o
n
d
c
o
l
u
m
n
o
f
t
h
i
s
t
a
b
l
e
d
o
n
o
t
e
x
a
c
t
l
y
m
a
t
c
h
t
h
e
i
r
s
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
w
e
u
s
e
s
a
m
p
l
i
n
g
w
e
i
g
h
t
s
f
o
r
a
l
l
o
f
o
u
r
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
t
o
a
d
j
u
s
t
f
o
r
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
s
t
u
d
y
p
e
r
i
o
d
i
n
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
o
f
r
a
n
d
o
m
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
t
o
t
h
e
t
h
r
e
e
M
T
O
g
r
o
u
p
s
,
w
h
i
l
e
C
M
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
f
o
r
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
T
A
N
F
,
a
n
d
f
o
o
d
s
t
a
m
p
s
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
s
e
w
e
i
g
h
t
s
,
b
u
t
d
o
n
o
t
u
s
e
t
h
e
w
e
i
g
h
t
s
f
o
r
w
e
e
k
l
y
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
.
N
o
t
e
a
l
s
o
t
h
a
t
o
u
r
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
o
f
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
d
o
n
o
t
e
x
a
c
t
l
y
m
a
t
c
h
t
h
e
i
r
s
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
w
e
u
s
e
t
w
o
-
t
a
i
l
e
d
t
-
t
e
s
t
s
,
w
h
i
l
e
t
h
e
y
u
s
e
o
n
e
-
t
a
i
l
e
d
t
-
t
e
s
t
s
.
†
.
P
!
.
1
0
*
.
P
!
.
0
5American Journal of Sociology
170
each control variable (equal to 1 in cases where the variable’s value was
missing, 0 otherwise). CM instead code many of these cases as missing.
In part B of table 2, we show that using imputed values for these control
variables increases the sample size by a few hundred cases but has little
effect on the qualitative pattern revealed by the data.
Working with CM’s data, we also discovered that their system for
classifying low-poverty integrated versus segregated neighborhoods is dif-
ferent from what we had inferred from their article. Speciﬁcally, they say,
“Following the criteria used by Gautreaux, we classify census tracts that
are under 30% minority (black and Hispanic) as ‘integrated neighbor-
hoods’ and those whose minority percentage exceeds this level as ‘seg-
regated.’” (p. 117). The Gautreaux program’s criterion was to move fam-
ilies into “predominantly white” tracts with less than 30%
African-American families (Keelsetal. 2005). WhatCMdid wastoclassify
low-poverty tracts as integrated if the census tract had less than 30%
African-American residents and lessthan 30%Hispanicresidents—sothat
in principle, a census tract that was nearly 60% minority would still be
counted as integrated so long as the African-American and Hispanic
shares were still both individually below 30%.
In part C of table 2, we show what happens when we use an equally
defensible measure of what constitutes an integrated neighborhood—spe-
ciﬁcally, census tracts that are less than 30% minority overall (African-
American, Hispanic, and other minority groups together). This deﬁnition
has the virtue of being more consistent with the Gautreaux program’s
goals of moving families to “predominantly white” neighborhoods. Com-
pared to CM’s classiﬁcation system, this deﬁnition reduces the amount
of time that MTO experimental-group families spent in low-poverty in-
tegrated neighborhoods.
19 When we use our system to deﬁne integrated
neighborhoods as less than 30% minority, rather than less than 30% black
and less than 30% Hispanic, we do not ﬁnd any evidence that extra time
in low-poverty integrated tracts rather than high-poverty tracts improves
any of the economic outcomes CM consider. There do still appear to be
signs of some effect of extra time in low-poverty segregatedareas,contrary
to CM’s hypothesis that race and social class integration together are
necessary to improve adult economic outcomes. More generally, if we
rerun this model using a measure of total months spent in low-poverty
census tracts (regardless of whether they are integrated or segregated), we
do not ﬁnd any evidence that living in a low-poverty rather than high-
19 CM’s system suggests that experimental families overall spent about 8.1 months in
low-poverty integrated neighborhoods, while our deﬁnition suggests something closer
to 3.8 months. Under our deﬁnition, experimental families spent somewhat more
months in low-poverty segregated tracts compared to CM’s system (21.39 vs. 17.08).MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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poverty area affects the economic outcomes studied by CM. In any case,
even these estimates are overstated, because they confound cohort with
time effects.
Cohort Effects vs. the Effects of Time in Low-Poverty Areas
One source of bias in CM’s estimates is that they confound the effects
on economic outcomes of spending more time in a low-poverty area with
differences in program impacts that vary by randomization entry cohorts
in MTO. Because of the limited capacity of the nonproﬁt agencies that
helped MTO experimentalfamiliesrelocate,andforotherreasons,families
who enrolled in MTO were randomly assigned into different mobility
groups over an extended period of time ranging from 1994 to 1998. CM’s
key explanatory variables of interest are the number of months spent in
low-poverty and high-poverty areas, both of which will (! 20%) (  20%)
on average be higher for earlier cohorts for mechanical reasons. In fact,
the only reason CM are even able to estimate a model that controls for
time in both low-poverty and high-poverty census tracts, yet avoids the
problem of perfect multicollinearity, is that some families were randomly
assigned earlier in time than others and so will have more months of
address data available between the time of randomization and the interim
MTO survey.
20 CM’s estimates confound cohort differences in MTO im-
pacts on survey outcomes with changes in impacts over time for reasons
similar to those in demography that often make it hard to disentangle
age, period, and cohort effects.
Some evidence for cohort differences in MTO impacts comes from table
3, taken from Orr et al. (2003, table G-7), which shows TOT impacts on
administrative data measures for TANF and food stamp beneﬁts, taken
ﬁve years after random assignment for cohorts randomly assigned earlier
(with an average time between randomization and interim survey of 81
20 If all MTO families had the same amount of postrandomization data (the same
number of months between time of random assignment and time at which the interim
MTO survey was conducted), the explanatory variables for number of months in low-
poverty integrated, low-poverty segregated, and high-poverty census tracts would be
perfectly multicollinear. This is easy to see by imagining that we simply rescaled the
variables for time in low-poverty and high-poverty areas by dividing by the sample
mean for total number of months of post–random assignment address data. If the
amount of postrandomization data were the same for everyone (always equal to the
mean), then the measures for share time in low-poverty and high-poverty areas would
together sum to one.American Journal of Sociology
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TABLE 3
Year 5 TOT Impacts on Outcomes Measured with Longitudinal
Administrative Records (in dollars)
Outcome
Experimental Section 8
Early
Cohort
Late
Cohort
Early
Cohort
Late
Cohort
TANF beneﬁts ..........  484 (251) 617 (335)  252 (218) 628* (236)
Food stamp beneﬁts ....  421* (173) 464* (226) 20 (153) 388* (178)
Source.—Orr et al. 2003, table G-7 (p. G-19).
Notes.— Numbers in parentheses are SEs. Results reported in constant 2001 dollars (see Orr
et al. 2003, p. 137).
*. P !.05
months) and those assigned later (average of 62 months).
21 The TOT
impacts are relatively largeand negativeforTANFandfoodstampreceipt
for the early cohorts—MTO moves cause these cohorts to be less likely
to be on social programs—but the impacts are large and of the opposite
sign for the later cohorts. Since earlier cohorts seem to beneﬁt more from
MTO than later cohorts, CM’s estimates attribute some effect to extra
time in low-poverty areas that is actually simply due to the fact that
earlier MTO cohorts seem to beneﬁt more from the program.
22
CM’s model seems to load some of this cohort effect onto the coefﬁcient
estimates for time spent in both low-poverty and high-poverty areas. This
helps explain why, in table 2, the coefﬁcients on extra time spent in high-
poverty areas are often a sizable share of the coefﬁcients estimated for
extra time in low-poverty integrated or segregated areas, and why the
estimated coefﬁcient for high-poverty areas is even different from zero at
conventional statistical cutoffs for food stamp receipt.
We can more directly see the confounding inﬂuences of cohort differ-
ences in MTO impacts by replicating CM’s model but now replacing their
measure for number of months spent in high-poverty census tracts with
a measure for the total number of months between random assignment
21 Orr et al. (2003, pp. G-18, G-19) note that random assignment occurred over an
extended period of time, and some sites were faster than others in randomizing families.
A simple split oftheMTO sample by thecalendartimeinwhichfamilieswererandomly
assigned would disproportionately assign families from some MTO sites to the “early
cohort” group and other sites to the “late cohort” group, which would confound efforts
to disentangle cohort differences from site differences in MTO impacts. As a result,
Orr and colleagues split the sample roughly in half by time of random assignment
within each site.
22 Orr et al. (2003, p. G-19) note there are several reasons why earlier cohorts might
beneﬁt more, including changes in HUD-funded demolitions of public housing over
time that might have changed both the mix of families who enrolled in MTO and the
neighborhood environments experienced by MTO controls.MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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in MTO and the interim MTO survey. Part D of table 2 shows that this
measure for total months of postrandomization data available for each
family, which is a direct indicator for which random-assignment cohort
each MTO family belongs to, is statistically signiﬁcant in each case and
1.5 to 2.0 times the estimated effect of extra time spent in a low-poverty
segregated area. The estimated effect of time spent in low-poverty inte-
grated neighborhoods is never statistically signiﬁcant. The estimated ef-
fects of each extra month spent in a low-poverty segregated neighborhood
are signiﬁcant for three of CM’s economic outcomes, but the average
marginal effects are quite small, equal to a 0.001 (one-tenth ofapercentage
point) increase in employment from each extra month in a low-poverty
segregated census tract, a  0.0009 change in TANF receipt, and  0.001
for food stamp receipt.
23 When we reestimate the model, pooling together
months in low-poverty integrated and segregated tracts, we ﬁnd no evi-
dence for any statistically signiﬁcant effect of extra time in low-poverty
areas on any of the outcomes considered by CM.
Selection Bias in Practice
The results presented in table 2 suggest that there could be some modest
correlation between time spent in a low-poverty neighborhood and eco-
nomic outcomes, even after conditioning on cohort effects (by controlling
for total months between random assignment and time of the interim
survey). We believe that these correlations are susceptible to selection bias
and so are wary of placing much inferential weight on CM’s ﬁndings or
those in our own table 2.
CM recognize that endogeneity or selection will necessarily be an issue
with any nonexperimental analysis and so refer to their new estimates as
“associations” rather than “effects.” At the same time, the title of CM’s
article begins with “Neighborhood Effects,” not “Neighborhood Associ-
ations.” They claim that their analyses “provide strong evidence that
neighborhoods may ‘matter’ in terms of adult economic self-sufﬁciency
23 Note that removing the variable for high-poverty months from the model means
that time spent in these areas becomes the comparison group for the variables for time
in low-poverty census tracts, and so we can then directly test the effect of time in
high- vs. low-poverty areas using just the coefﬁcients and standard errors for the low-
poverty measures. Part D of table 2 comes from using the NBER sample and NBER
measures of low-poverty integrated and segregated neighborhoods but now replacing
the measure of high-poverty neighborhood months with total months. When we use
the CM sample and CM neighborhood measures and replace the measure for months
in high-poverty areas with total number of post–random assignment months, we see
a similar pattern, such that the estimated effect of time in low-poverty integrated areas
is never statistically signiﬁcant and time in low-poverty segregated tracts is signiﬁcant
for employment and food stamps.American Journal of Sociology
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as well, though having more speciﬁc neighborhood targets and a longer
required stay than MTO did are important. Thus, there is substantial
evidence for keeping geographically speciﬁc vouchers on the table in order
to offer low-income families a chance to improve their well-being” (pp.
139–40).
CM are trying to thread a narrow rhetorical needle. They acknowledge
that their estimates may be susceptible to some degree of selection bias,
and so they do not want to claim that their new ﬁndings capture the
precise causal effects of neighborhood environments on economic out-
comes. But at the same time they want to argue that their new estimates
provide enough useful information about neighborhood effects to inform
policy decisions. What they seem to be implicitly claiming is that their
estimates are, if not exactly right, at least in the right ballpark.
However, there is no way to tell whether these results are in fact in the
right ballpark. Recall that CM’s model includes measures of time spent
in low-poverty neighborhoods and indicators for MTO treatment group
and compliance status. CM’s estimates for the effects of speciﬁc neigh-
borhood characteristics on economic outcomes are thus essentially a
weighted average of three regression-adjusted differences: the mean out-
comes for experimental-group compliers who chose (or were able) tospend
a long time in low-poverty areas versus compliers who spent less time in
low-poverty areas; the difference in outcomes between experimental non-
compliers who spent a long time in low-poverty areas versus those who
spent less time in low-poverty areas; and the difference in outcomes be-
tween control families who spent more time in low-poverty areas than
other families in the control group.
CM’s approach to estimating the effects of cumulative time spent in
low-poverty areas on employment outcomes measured from the interim
survey is particularly vulnerable to selection biases. For example, any
number of chance circumstances that might lead quickly to an unusually
good job situation (e.g., seeing a “help wanted” sign for a well-paying job
in a neighborhood store) will increase the chances of being able to afford
to continue to live in a better neighborhood and having a better job at
the time of the interim survey. In this case, employment is as much a
cause as a result of the neighborhood conditions.
A growing body of research demonstrates that the magnitude of selec-
tion bias with nonexperimental estimators can often be quite large in
practice. This type of evidence is derived from what Shadish (2000) calls
a “within-study comparison,” which involves using data from a random-
ized experiment to estimate the true causal effect of some policy or pro-
gram intervention and then reestimating the effect using different non-
experimental methods. In our own previous research, we have shown that
applying nonexperimental estimates to the MTO data can lead to severelyMTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
175
biased estimates that are far away from the true causal effects estimated
using the randomly assigned variation in the experimental data. For ex-
ample, Kling et al. (2007, p. 98) use data just from the MTO control group
alone and regress a measure of duration-weighted average census tract
poverty against various outcomes, controlling for a similar set of baseline
characteristics to that employed by CM. They ﬁnd that ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates are typically of the opposite sign of those derived
by using MTO random assignment as an instrument for tract poverty
rates. Moreover, they suggest that the nature of the selection process is
more complicated than is often assumed, because “adults and families
with female teenagers likely to have adverse outcomes tended to move
to low-poverty neighborhoods, and families with male teenagers likely to
have beneﬁcial outcomes tended to move to low-poverty neighborhoods”
(Kling et al. 2007, p. 107).
We have also found severe bias resulting from applying nonexperi-
mental methods to the MTO data even in our study of violence among
young people, for which we have detailed data about preprogram out-
comes that are relatively strongpredictorsofsubsequentbehavior.Ludwig
and Kling (2007) generate a nonexperimental estimate for the effect of
neighborhood violent-crime rates on violent behavior by individual MTO
program participants by using data just from the MTO experimental
group alone. These nonexperimental estimates suggest that a 1-SD in-
crease in the local-area violent crime rate leads to 0.078 more violent-
crime arrests per male youth in the MTO study (SE p 0.046), even after
controlling for the census-tract poverty rate and share minority. In con-
trast, experimental estimates that use data from all three MTO groups
and interactions of MTO group assignment and demonstration site as
instruments suggest no effect, or perhaps even the opposite relationship
(point estimate of  0.109; SE p 0.117).
More generally, studies dating back at least to LaLonde (1986) yield
an accumulating body of evidence that nonexperimental estimates can
often be severely biased, even in cases where relatively rich covariatedata
are available. Even commonly used approaches to this problem, such as
difference-in-differences and propensity-score methods, have been found
to be subject to large biases in other applications such as job training
programs or schooling (Agodini and Dynarski 2004; Wilde and Hollister
2007).
24 In some cases, nonexperimental methods are able to come “close”
24 LaLonde (1986) focuses on estimating the effects of workforce training programs on
less skilled workers, based on data from a randomized job-training experiment carried
out by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation in the 1970s. A large
follow-up literature has reexamined this issueinthejob-trainingapplication,sometimes
using the same data as LaLonde but otherwise often focusing on job training, in part
because of the availability of experimental data in that area. For a recent discussionAmerican Journal of Sociology
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to the true causal effect revealed by experimental analysis, consistent with
the idea that in some cases selection into different treatments or social
settings could potentially occur mostly on the basis of individual char-
acteristics that are observable to the analyst. The problem is that the
diagnostic tools available for determining when a given nonexperimental
method is working well in a given application are quite limited in their
predictive power. Thus, we are wary of placing a great deal of inferential
weight on the bulk of nonexperimental neighborhood effects study that
dominates the literature.
We believe that nonexperimental methods can sometimes be useful. But
in our judgment, useful causal inferences are most likely to come from
nonexperimental research designs that focus on understanding the process
through which people are assigned or select into different programs or
social environments. In particular, when selection is known to have oc-
curred on the basis of observable characteristics, then some regression or
propensity-score methods can yield useful evidence.
More often, we do not know exactly what is driving the selection pro-
cess, and we should worry that selection could occur in part on the basis
of factors that are not well understood or easily measured. In these cases,
valid causal inference is most likely to come from studies that can isolate
aspects of the treatment process that are plausibly unrelated to individual
characteristics that also affect outcomes and from using just the variation
in treatments or social settings generated by that exogenous process—that
is, focusing on the study of “natural experiments.” Good examples in the
area of neighborhood or housing studies include Oreopoulos (2003), Jacob
(2004), and Jacob and Ludwig (2007). CM take exactly the opposite ap-
proach—they ignore the exogenous variation in neighborhoods generated
by MTO and focus entirely on the self-selected differences in neighbor-
hoods within randomly assigned MTO groups—so there is no reason to
put any stock in their results.
Estimating Duration Impacts
The longitudinal administrative data that were collected for the interim
MTO evaluation provide some suggestive—but only suggestive—evi-
focused on the use of propensity-score methods in this application, see Dehejia and
Wahba (1999), Michalopoulos, Bloom, and Hill (2004), and Smith and Todd (2005).
More recently, Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2006) use a “between-study
comparison” and ask whether the nonexperimental literature on job training as a whole
is consistent with the experimental literature overall, adjusting for differences across
studies in things like program populations and job-training interventions. They ﬁnd
that the two types of research literatures are reasonably close with respect to job-
training impacts on women, but not very close for men or adolescents.MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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dence that MTO’s impacts on adult economic outcomes might become
more beneﬁcial over time (Orr et al. 2003; Kling et al. 2007). An alternative
approach to examining the effects of time spent in a low-poverty area
that is more in keeping with MTO’s experimental design is to use the IV
approach from Kling et al. (2007). This approach exploits the fact that
the MTO experimental-group and Section 8 comparison-group treatments
generate different effects on postrandomization neighborhood trajectories,
and these treatment effects on neighborhood trajectoriesvaryacrossMTO
demonstration sites. This enables us to compare variation across sites in
MTO group differences with respect to neighborhood characteristics with
group differences in economic or other outcomes to test for a “dose-
response” relationship.
For example, in every MTO demonstration site, average duration-
weighted tract poverty rates are lower for families assigned to the ex-
perimental group than for those in the control group. (This explanatory
variable, unlike the one used by CM, is not mechanically related to the
time at which families were randomly assigned). But these experimental/
control differences in average tract poverty rates vary across sites, as
shown in ﬁgure 1, which presents mean adult employment rates and
average tract poverty rates for each MTO group by site, relative to each
site’s mean. Speciﬁcally, the experimental/control difference in average
tract poverty rates is largest in the Los Angeles site, smallest in the Boston
site, and roughly similar in magnitude in the other MTO demonstration
sites. Figure 1 also demonstrates the value for tracing out these neigh-
borhood effect dose-response relationships that is added by having data
on a second mobility group—the Section 8 comparison group, which was
offered unrestricted housing vouchers to relocate and in every site ex-
perienced changes in average tract poverty rates that are somewhat more
modest than those experienced by the experimental group in that site.
Note, for example, that the Section 8/control difference in average tract
poverty rates is smallest in New York even though the experimental/
control difference in tract poverty for that site is not an outlier compared
to the other sites. The differences across sites in MTO mobility-group
variation in average tract poverty rate are due to some combination of
MTO experimental or Section 8–only compliers’ making relatively more
dramatic initial MTO moves in some sites than in others and/or their
willingness to persist in low-poverty areas for longer periods of time.
If adult employment outcomes were improved by greater exposure to
relatively lower-poverty census tracts, then we would see the largest dif-
ference in adult employment rates (vertical axis) between the Los Angeles
experimental and control groups (the site-groups with the largest differ-
ence in average tract poverty rate, as shown in the horizontal axis). But
in fact, the average employment rates are very similar in the experimentalF
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and control groups in the Los Angeles site. The same dose-response logic
suggests that we should see a relatively small difference in employment
rates between the Section 8 and control groups in the New York site,
since the group contrast in average tract poverty issmallestherecompared
to all of the other treatment/control contrasts across the MTO sites. But
again, that is not the case.
More generally, the regression line ﬁt through the 15 site-group means
shown in ﬁgure 1 is downward-sloping but rather ﬂat, suggesting that
there is not much relationship between average tract poverty rates and
employment rates. This regression line through the site-group means is
essentially what is estimated by a two-stage least squares procedure that
uses interactions between indicators for MTO demonstration sites and
mobility group assignments as instrumental variables for average tract
poverty rate in a regression that has adult employment as the outcome
of interest.
With this approach, a neighborhood socioeconomic measure such as
duration-weighted average tract poverty rates (POV) is viewed as a sum-
mary index for a bundle of neighborhood characteristics that are changed
as a result of MTO. Interactions between treatment-group assignments
(e) and site indicators (S) are used as instrumental variables to isolate the
experimentally induced variation in POV across sites and groups, as in
equation (1), where the main site effects are subsumed in X together with
the same standard set of baseline covariates controlled for by CM and in
our own previous published work on MTO. Controlling for these baseline
covariates serves mainly to improve the precision of our estimates. We
also use weights to adjust for changes over the course of the MTO ex-
periment in the probability that subjects are randomly assigned to the
three MTO mobility groups (see Orr et al. 2003). The ﬁrst-stage power
of our estimates is quite high: The F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of the
instruments in ﬁrst-stage equation (1), using the full sample, is equal to
40.5 ( ). Table 4 shows the results for l2 from a separate estimation P ! .001
of equations (1) and (2) for different outcomes and analytic samples, where
Y in equation (2) is some behavioral outcome of interest.
POV p (e # S)m   Xb     . (1) 1 1 1
Y p POVl   Xb     . (2) 2 2 2
Table 4 shows the results of estimating this IV procedure for different
outcome measures (rows) and analytic samples (columns), where each cell
reports the coefﬁcient from a different two-stage least squares regression.
We do not see much support for the idea that more pronounced and
sustained changes in tract poverty rates translate into improved adultAmerican Journal of Sociology
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TABLE 4
Instrumental Variable Estimates for Effects of Tract Poverty on
MTO Adult Economic Outcomes
Outcome Measure
Full
Sample
Random Cohort Assignment
Early Late
Psychological distress (K-6
index) ..................... .239* (.117) .112 (.174) .284* (.142)
Employed ...................  .159 (.161)  .253 (.234)  .016 (.202)
Weekly earnings ............ 29 (71)  59 (106) 164 (88)
TANF receipt ............... .147 (.151) .411 (.216)  .150 (.195)
Food stamps receipt ........ .028 (.160) .290 (.238)  .244 (.200)
N ............................. 3,664 1,823 1,841
Notes.—The table presents point estimates and SEs (in parentheses) using interactions of
MTO treatment group and MTO demonstration site as instrumental variables for duration-
weighted postrandomization average tract poverty rate. These estimates control for a set of
standard baseline covariates related to the adult’s educational attainment, baseline employment
status, and social program participation and use weights to adjust for a change in the random-
ization rates across MTO groups during the course of the program period (see Orr et al. [2003]
for details).
*. P !.05
economic outcomes. We see slightly larger point estimatesforlabormarket
outcomes for early cohorts relative to those derived using either the full
sample or just the late cohorts, but this may simply reﬂect the fact that
the economic outcomes for earlier cohorts of programparticipantsrespond
differently than do those of later cohorts (as demonstrated in table 3). In
contrast, the estimate in the top row of table 4 for the full MTO sample
indicates a large and statistically signiﬁcant improvement in adult mental
health (reductions in Ronald Kessler’s K-6 index) from more time spent
in lower-poverty areas.
It is important to note that our IV estimates in table 4 cannot be
interpreted literally as the effects of changing neighborhood poverty rates
on the economic outcomes of MTO adults. Our tract poverty measure
captures the effects of the entire bundle of community attributes that are
correlated with tract poverty and that inﬂuence economic outcomes. With
only 10 instruments, our ability to isolate the distinct effects of separate
neighborhood attributes on outcomes is necessarily limited (see Kling et
al. [2007] for an extended discussion).
25
25 Ludwig and Kling (2007) show that there is enough variation across MTO sites and
groups to distinguish the effects of tract SES composition from tract racial composition
on violent-crime arrests of MTO participants. When we try to instrument for both
tract SES and racial composition with adult economic outcomes as the dependent
variable of interest, the estimated effects of duration-weighted tract poverty change
only slightly in comparison to the results in table 4, while the estimated effects for
tract share minority are quite imprecise.MTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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CONCLUSIONS
Empirical evidence on the existence and nature of neighborhood effects
is important, given that fully 7.9 million people lived in high-poverty
census tracts in 2000 (Jargowsky 2003). Housing and other social policies
affect the concentration of poor families in highly disadvantaged neigh-
borhoods. There is great demand from policy makers across the country
to understand whether and how neighborhood environments affect the
life chances of low-income families, and, if so, what to do about it. The
MTO experiment provides the best opportunity to date for answering
some of these questions.
Our disagreement with CM concerns the best way to analyze the MTO
data and what inferences can and cannot be supported from these anal-
yses. CM end their article with an argument for how analysts should use
the MTO data in the future: “Measuring the effect of a voucher offer is
vital to assessing the experimentally sound results of the policy demon-
stration. However, if MTO data are used to measureneighborhood effects,
different assumptions and techniques should be considered,” using non-
experimental models that “sacriﬁce MTO’s experimental design” (p. 139).
We believe that their assessment of the ability of experimental MTO
analysis to be informative about neighborhood effects is misguided and
that their speciﬁc prescriptions for future MTO analyses are likely to
generate erroneous conclusions.
Experimental estimates of the effects of MTO voucher offers and uti-
lization are useful for understanding the scope of neighborhood effects
on behavioral outcomes for low-income families, currently living in some
of our nation’s most disadvantaged communities, who wish to relocate—
a highly policy-relevant group. Random assignment offamiliestodifferent
MTO mobility groups, some of which are offered housing vouchers, gen-
erates large differences in average neighborhood trajectoriesacrossgroups
with respect to such community attributes as socioeconomic composition,
safety, disorder, informal social control, and thesocialtiesofMTOfamilies
themselves. Sociological and other theories predict that these neighbor-
hood attributes inﬂuence behavior.
Large neighborhood differences across MTO groups persist despite the
fact that only some families assigned to the experimental group moved
through the program, MTO moves generated relatively little residential
integration by race and ethnicity, and somefamiliesmovinginconjunction
with the program eventually moved on to worse neighborhoods. None of
these facts bias our ITT or TOT estimates of the effects of the differing
neighborhood bundles caused by random assignment to the MTO treat-
ment. If neighborhood environments affect behavior four to seven years
after baseline among the sort of people who enroll in MTO, then theseAmerican Journal of Sociology
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neighborhood effects ought to be reﬂected in ITT and TOT impacts on
behavior.
Thus, MTO tells us something important about the effects of mobility
interventions in the medium run for an important population of low-
income families living in very distressed urban areas. It shows us that
moving out of a disadvantaged, dangerous neighborhood into more af-
ﬂuent and safer areas does not have detectable impacts on economic
outcomes four to seven years out. However, such neighborhood moves
do have important effects on other self-reported measures of the well-
being of program participants (which surely countforsomething),onadult
mental health and some physical health outcomes, andonviolentbehavior
among young people.
Nonexperimental analyses of the type conducted by CM reintroduce
all of the selection bias problems that MTO was designed to overcome.
Moreover, their model confounds changes in neighborhood effects as fam-
ilies stay in low-poverty areas longer with neighborhood effects that vary
by random assignment cohort in MTO, as suggested by the fact that
controlling for random-assignment cohort greatly reduces the magnitude
of CM’s estimated effects of time spent in low-poverty areas. And their
results provide no support for their arguments about the importance of
integrating by both race and social class.
We should emphasize that the MTO estimates are informative only
about the effects of mobility programs like MTO on the types of low-
income families who would choose to participate in such programs. MTO
is silent on the effects of involuntary mobility programs, which is an
important point, given ongoing HOPE VI activities across the country to
demolish some of our highest-poverty housing projects.
Readers are also cautioned against trying to draw inferencesfromMTO
about interventions designed to change disadvantaged neighborhoods
themselves, rather than relocating residentstootherareas.Comparedwith
MTO, this type of intervention requires much greater knowledge on the
part of policy makers about what speciﬁc neighborhood attributes matter
most for improving outcomes. If policy makers focus on changing the
wrong set of neighborhood attributes, the impacts of a place-based in-
tervention could be less beneﬁcial than what we see in MTO. The effects
of a place-based program might also differ from MTO because the former
might be less disruptive to the existing social networks of families.
Whether that would lead to more- or less-beneﬁcial impacts compared to
MTO is not obvious as a conceptual matter; for some families, existing
social ties may hinder rather than help their economic and otheroutcomes,
and so the net effect of leaving these networks unchanged will depend
in part on the distribution of positive and negative network connections.
We agree with CM that it is possible that MTO impactsonparticipatingMTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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families might grow larger over time, if families become more socially
integrated into their new communities or are able to accumulate more
human capital as a result of their improved mental health. The best way
to test this hypothesis is additional data collection—from administrative
records on MTO families for a longer time period and a second wave of
detailed survey reports from MTO participants. This possibility suggests
the great importance of continuing to follow MTO families into thefuture,
a point that CM are sure to join our team in endorsing.
APPENDIX
To help clarify the issues around selection bias, we review Heckman’s
(1996) framework for thinking about how randomized experiments help
overcome selection. Let represent some economic, health, or other out- Y 1i
come for a given low-income adult (i) if he uses a voucher to move into
a low-poverty area, and let represent the outcome this person would Y 0i
receive if he did not have a voucher and so remained in a high-poverty
area. Let di p 1 if the person uses a voucher; otherwise, di p 0. The
essential problem for social scientists is that a given individual either uses
a voucher or does not; we cannot observe both and at the same YY 1i 0i
point in time for the same person, and so we must rely on different
statistical methods to estimate the missing data on counterfactual
outcomes.
Assume that the potential outcomes for people in both states (low pov-
erty with voucher and high poverty) are functions of observable variables
(Xi) as well as other variables that are usually not observed in the standard
data sets that are typically used to estimate neighborhood effects on labor
market or other outcomes (Ui):
Y p g (X )   U , E(U ) p 0; (A1) 1i 1 i 1i 1i
Y p g (X )   U , E(U ) p 0. (A2) 0i 0 i 0i 0i
The outcome we actually observe for a given person is Y p dY   ii 1i
, and so by substituting this into equations (A1) and (A2) and (1   d )Y i 0i
deﬁning , we get D p (Y   Y ) i 1i 0i
Y p g (X )   d {[g (X )   g (X )]   (U   U )}   U i 0 ii 1 i 0 i 1i 0i 0i
p g (X )   d D   U . (A3) 0 i i i 0i
People might beneﬁt from living in a lower-poverty neighborhood with
a housing voucher because, for instance, labor market outcomes for high
school dropouts (an observable characteristic in Xi) are better in areasAmerican Journal of Sociology
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that are closer to less-skilled job opportunities; this would be represented
by the difference . Alternatively, they might have improved g (X )   g (X ) 1 i 0 i
labor market outcomes because living in a lower-poverty area reduces an
unobserved variable that makes it difﬁcult to work, such as stress; this
would be reﬂected by the difference . U   U 1i 0i
Equation (A3) is essentially a stylized version of the sort of nonexper-
imental regression analysis that dominates the neighborhood effects lit-
erature. Instead of a simple dichotomous indicator for living in a low-
poverty or high-poverty area, most studies regress some outcome of
interest against a series of neighborhood variables that tend to be those
that are easily measured from the decennial census, such as census-tract
poverty rates or tract %minority. The key econometric issues are similar
if d is a vector of continuous neighborhood measures rather than a binary
scalar. The set of control variables (X) generally includes standard de-
mographic variables such as age, education, and raceand mayalsoinclude
more involved individual-level background variables, such as parents’
education levels, family income, or even more detailed measures of family
functioning.
Selection bias occurs when di is not orthogonalto theunobservedfactors
that inﬂuence outcomes (U1i and U0i in the equations above), so that
. Selection bias is difﬁcult to avoid with non- E[U   U Fd p 1, X ] ( 0 1i 0i i i
experimental analysis, because individual characteristics that affect the
outcome variable will inevitably be left out of the regression. Moreover,
the direction of this bias is difﬁcult to predict by theory alone.
Randomization solves the selection problem by causing the variation
in neighborhood of residence to occur for reasons that are uncorrelated
with individuals’ potential outcomes. Building on the notation introduced
above, let if a person (i) is randomly assigned to theMTOtreatment e p 1 i
group and so is eligible to receive a MTO voucher, while if the e p 0 i
person is assigned to the MTO control group. The main experimental
results come from comparing the outcomes of all of the families random-
ized into the treatment group with those of all the families randomized
into the control group, calculated mechanically by regressing Y against e
and adjusting for baseline covariates X to improve precision. This ITT
analysis measures the effect of offering families a housing voucher and
housing mobility counseling.
To see why partial compliance does not introduce selection bias in the
experiment, use the potential outcomes framework from above and let
represent the probability that someone with observable char- P(d p 1FX ) ii
acteristics Xi makes an MTO move in equation (A4). If MTO treatment-
group assignment has no effect on those who do not move through the
program (represented as ), then E[YFd p 0, e p 1] p E[YFd p 0, e p 0] i i i i i i
the change in outcomes (Y) induced by assignment to the experimentalMTO Symposium: What Can We Learn from MTO?
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rather than the control group is equal to the mean effect of MTO moves
on those who move (represented as , and known more E(D Fd p 1, X ) i i i
generally as the TOT effect), multiplied by the share of people who will
make MTO moves if given the chance, . P(d p 1FX ) ii
Y p g (X )   [E(D Fd p 1, X )]P(d p 1FX )e i 0 i i i i i i i
  (U   U )P(d p 1FX )e   U . (A4) 1i 0i i i i 0i
The key virtue of random assignment is that the indicator for assign-
ment to the treatment group, e, will be independent of the background
characteristics of MTO sample respondents, X, the potential outcomes
people would experience with and without a voucher, Y0 and Y1, and the
probability of leasing up if offered a voucher, . The fact that P(d p 1FX)
only some MTO families assigned to the experimental group comply with
their treatment assignment and relocate through the program does not
introduce any bias to our estimates, because this propensity to move
through MTO is balanced across families assigned to both the experi-
mental and control groups. Similarly, random assignment balances the
propensity to stay in a low-poverty area rather than move back to a
slightly higher-poverty area, and so subsequent mobility after families
make their initial MTO moves also does not introduce any bias to the
ITT estimate.
A more subtle point is that there is some “selection bias” in equation
(A4), in the sense that the baseline covariates, X, are not independent of
the unobserved determinants of potential outcomes U1 and U0 (Heckman
1996). In our previous published estimates for MTO impacts on outcomes
(e.g., Kling et al. 2005; Kling et al. 2007), we controlled for baseline char-
acteristics to improve the precision of our ITT and TOT estimates, but
the fact that these baseline measures may be correlated with unobservable
determinants of postrandomization outcomes means that we cannot in-
terpret the coefﬁcients on the baseline covariates as causal effects. But,
as Heckman (1996) notes, this type of “selection bias” (correlation of back-
ground controls with the error term) is balanced across randomly assigned
groups, and so it will not affect our ability to generate an unbiased ITT
estimate. The ITT estimate compares all members of the treatment group
to all members of the control group, and so by construction does not suffer
from selection bias itself.
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